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Germany in 2016 finds itself in the midst of a political and diplomatic revolution, 
the meaning of which is unclear for United States policy other than this process 
constitutes a break with custom and tradition in statecraft. This thesis analyzes the 
evolution of German foreign policy and security policy since revival of statecraft in 1945 
and the changes in policy determinants since 1990. This evolution can be separated into 
phases beginning with the policy of reconciliation associated with the birth of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949 culminating with the reunification of Germany in 1990. 
Having achieved the goals of reconciliation—regaining sovereignty, ensuring security, 
and achieving reunification, the determinants of the security policy shifted as Germany’s 
relative geographic and diplomatic position in Europe shift during NATO and EU 
expansion. This led to policy eventually evolving into a focused effort towards European 
integration and ultimately—as the new generation of Germans raised under the peace and 
economic success after reunification—becoming a civilian power. Emerging from this 
period, a new Germany confident enough to declare leadership from the centre assumed 
de facto leadership in the European Union. The dichotomy of Germany’s past and 
ambitions in foreign and security policy and the effects of its shifting geographic position 
within Europe are the key drivers of foreign policy. 
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The Munich Security Conference of 2015 took place during the Ukraine crisis, the 
heating up of the migrant crisis, and the Eurozone economic crisis in Greece. In each of 
these crises, Germany, headed by Chancellor Angela Merkel, assumed a leadership role 
in management of the crisis. During the 2015 Munich Security Conference, Dr. Ursula 
von der Leyen, the German Minister of Defence, suggested that Germany is ready to 
“lead from the centre.”1  Leadership from the centre can mean many things for Germany, 
but the essence is a recognition by the elite of the German government that they must 
have the will and the capability to support their foreign security policy aims amidst a 
rapidly changing Europe and the international system.2  While this statement taken at 
face value sounds to be a bold change in German foreign and security policy, certain 
observers commented on the speech and dismissed it as political rhetoric.3   
The statement came as a response to the opening article of the 2015 Munich 
Security Report titled “Germany: Ready to Lead?” which was distributed as a 
conversation starter for the conference.4  The pressure for Germany to act more on the 
international stage did not originate from foreign commentators but from the German 
leadership during the 2014 Munich Security Conference as well as the press of events of 
a singular nature. Speeches from leaders like Joachim Gauck, the German president, 
prompted that, “Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should 
make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.”5  The German Foreign 
Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier echoed Gauck stating, “Germany must be ready for 
                                               
1 Ursula Von der Leyen, “Leadership from the Centre,” (speech, 51st Munich Security Conference, 
Munich, February 6, 2015). 
2 Von der Leyen, “Leadership from the Centre.”  
3 Nina Werkhäuser, “To Lead or Not to Lead?,” Deustche Welle, February 7, 2015, 
http://dw.com/p/1EXdQ.  
4 “Germany: Ready To Lead?,” from Munich Security Report 2015 (Munich: Munich Security 
Conference Foundation, 2015), 10. 
5 Munich Security Report 2015, 10. 
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earlier, more decisive and more substantive engagement in the foreign and security policy 
sphere,” concluding that, “indifference is not an option for Germany.”6   
Dr. Von der Leyen’s 2015 speech at the security conference stated that leadership 
from the centre means “to contribute one’s best resources and capabilities to alliances and 
partnerships,” “to enable others with less resources to make their vital contributions as 
equal partners,” and “to make others fit to assume responsibility for security in their own 
regions.” She added that, 
the unconditional willingness to analyse and make decisions in a common 
approach—the willingness to create a common legitimacy, also in the 
form of new partnerships, for a commitment that in a globalised world no 
longer has any geographical limits: No nation—whatever its size— to 
successfully and permanently resolve conflicts on its own.7   
A closer look at these statements reveals more than just political rhetoric, but instead, it 
announces to the world that Germany recognizes that it has to assume more responsibility 
in maintaining global security in the new world order. 
The traditional guarantor of European security since the close of World War II 
(WWII), the United States, has since September 11, 2001, shifted more of its focus to the 
Middle East.  Even before the end of the Cold War, the US Department of Defense 
(DOD) gave more attention to the Middle East, and since 1990, the Middle East has 
become the main region of the American military effort.  At the same time this left 
Germany, with unity in that year, to prosper in a unified and peaceful Europe devoted to 
trade, sustainability, and life-style in which strife was a problem for someone else. 
Germany grew into its new role in the past decade for many reasons but partially because 
of the lack of interest in the United States concerning the security of Europe. The United 
States government has since announced in 2011 a plan—the so called “Pacific pivot”—to 
realign its statecraft and military forces to a new region of increasing strategic 
importance. In this vacuum of security leadership in Europe, Germany has emerged onto 
                                               
6 Munich Security Report 2015, 10. 
7 Von der Leyen, “Leadership.”  
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the international scene to take the reins in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine 
with the assistance of France.   
The English-speaking world responded in 1989 and 1990 with fear about a revival 
of German power in national unity. While many of these dire predictions have proven to 
be exaggerations—especially those that predicted nuclear ambitions—the observers did 
recognize that a reunited Germany would transform the order of nations in Europe just as 
it had done under Bismarck. As this document is being written in 2016, Germany finds 
itself in the midst of a political and diplomatic revolution the meaning of which is unclear 
for US policy other than this process constitutes a break with custom and tradition in 
statecraft. Beginning in 1945, German foreign and security policy centered on the politics 
of reconciliation with the goals of regaining sovereignty, ensuring security, and 
ultimately achieving reunification. A change in security policy began shortly after 
reunification as Germany realized all the goals of the policy of reconciliation. Germany 
evolved into a civilian power centering its security policy on promoting the rule of law 
and building economic integration. Germany again succeeded in achieving its foreign and 
security policy goals gaining more power—eclipsing both the United Kingdom and 
France—to become the lead nation in Europe. 
Thus, urgent is knowledge as to when and how did Germany step into the 
leadership role in the EU?  How is Germany preparing to be a power capable of “leading 
from the centre”?  What considerations are influencing the new German approach to 
foreign policy?  Should the rest of Europe and the United States be concerned with 
Germany’s rise in power or support it? 
Luigi Barzini in his travelogue, The Europeans, reflects that everyone dealing in 
Europe has had and always will need to better understand the “Mutable Germans”:  
It is therefore once again essential for everybody, the French, the British, 
the Italians, the other Europeans, as well as the Americans and the Soviets, 
to keep an eye across the Rhine and the Alps and the Elbe in order to 
figure out, as our fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, the ancient 
Romans, and remote ancestors had to do, who the Germans arc, who they 
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think they are, what they they’re doing, and where they will go next, 
wittingly or unwittingly.8 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The major research questions to be answered are as follows: What are the 
character and causes for continuity as well as change in the German security and defense 
policy since German reunification and the end of the Cold War?  As the security situation 
in Europe has evolved in the wake of the terrorists attack on the United States on 
September 11, 2001, how has the German government adapted to meet new security and 
defense challenges?  What is the driving force behind Germany’s desire to assume more 
responsibility for European Security?   
To answer the questions, this thesis will build the foundation of West German 
security and defence policy leading up to reunification and will investigate how German 
security and defense policy has evolved since reunification, examining the external 
triggers, domestic constraints, and the stated foreign policy aims gathered relevant 
sources. The thesis will also break down leadership from the centre and determine 
whether this represents a new course for German security and defence policy. This thesis 
will also evaluate German foreign policy decisions since unification and whether the 
decisions led to the security and defense goals being met or were at least in line with the 
stated goals.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
The driving forces behind Germany’s foreign policy are evolving, and as they 
evolve, the relationship with other countries—including the United States—must also 
evolve. The government of Germany is no longer held captive by the guilt of the 
Holocaust or the constraints of the Cold War division. Since 1990, a reunified Germany 
has quickly evolved from the beaten nation geographically situated at the edge of 
Western Europe to a nation that is both diplomatically and geographically at the center of 
                                               
8 Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 69. Admittedly, Barzini’s 
reflection of the Germans is not well developed, but his recognition of the central importance of Germany 
in European affairs is well founded. 
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Europe. Germany has regained its status as a great power alongside the Unites States, 
Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, and Japan.9   
Germany has already demonstrated its desire to lead in Europe. The most recent 
foreign policy crises in Europe caused Germany to assume a de facto leadership role 
driving European Union policy. Once firmly planted in this role, Germany has not 
relented or wavered in its new leadership role but instead announced that Germany is 
ready to lead. Germany’s size and economic power will continue to place Germany in the 
leadership role within the European Union for years to come, and this shift in the balance 
of power must be met respectively by other nations dealing with Europe. 
C. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Germany wants to take a larger leadership role on the world stage. The external 
forces explained by realism and the responsibilities of the “Leadership from the Centre” 
policy will require a more capable Bundeswehr in addition to the civilian and economic 
power Germany already possesses. In order to attain this goal, the government will need 
to socially construct domestic support for military while respecting the culture of 
atonement. Germany will continue to want to act militarily within a coalition—preferably 
within the European Union—but also in NATO as required to support its foreign policy 
ambitions. However, as the Americans pivot to the Pacific and tensions with Russia 
continue to rise, Germany will have to assume a more military role to advance its foreign 
policy.   
Many academics believe that a culture of atonement and the lessons of defeat are 
potential causes for the past resistance to the operational use of the Bundeswehr. The 
foreign policy of reconciliation best describes the reasons why Germany has sought to 
abstain from military operations from the end of WWII to unification. The external 
triggers and concerns over the current security situation in Europe have led to a change in 
conduct of the German foreign policy. While German foreign policy has not become 
more militaristic per se, the de facto leadership role of the foreign policy of the EU 
                                               
9 Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, International Relations 10th ed. (New York: Pearson, 
2014), 54. 
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concerning the Ukraine crisis requires a strong military capability to support the foreign 
policy goals. The German legacy of “Nie wieder Krieg, Nie wieder Auschwitz!” has led 
the Bundeswehr to seek to operate only within a coalition. The strong support for NATO, 
CSDP, and a possible European Army are evidence of this support. But as the Germans 
realize that the limitations of the EU security arrangement, and they begin to shift away 
from transatlantic security, a focus on providing more support for the Bundeswehr will 
move more to the front of German security and defense policy debates. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will source mainly scholarly works and news articles with a few case 
studies to support main themes of change and continuity of German foreign policy. The 
thesis will answer the research questions by comparing Germany’s stated security and 
defense policy aims using primary sources and news articles relating events and 
statements along with scholarly analysis to find trends and patterns since unification that 
may clarify the present-day foreign policy goals. The literature review will look at a 
broad cross-section of disciplines—including history, geopolitics, and international 
relations theory—to narrow in on the key determinants of German foreign policy goals. 
The thesis will use sources in English and German, including comparisons of different 
points of view from diverse countries in order to gain a wide spectrum of perspectives 
concerning Germany’s foreign policy. A review of the 1994 and the 2006 White Papers 
will also shed important trends and changes in the foreign policy goals in respect to 
security policy. The thesis will use a few case studies of military operations to evaluate 
public sentiment and political will and how they have evolved since unification. The case 
studies will provide support for statements and scholarly analysis. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The thesis will consist of five chapters. After an introduction, the second chapter, 
“Prelude to Reunification,” will examine the history of the original unification of 
Germany under Prussia in 1864-1871 as a basis for how a powerful Germany disrupted 
the delicate balance of power in Europe. For reasons of compactness as well as the 
urgency of the moment, the period between World War I and the surrender of Nazi 
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Germany in 1945 is largely absent from this thesis. Instead, the focus in this chapter will 
be on the foreign and security policy of reconciliation adopted by the Bonn government, 
and how it shaped public and international perception about Germany’s place in 
international affairs. The chapter will address the conflicting while also complementing 
policies of Westbindung—western orientation—and Ostpolitik—eastern policy. The 
chapter will also examine acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into 
NATO and the path to regaining sovereignty, security, and reunification as a means to 
develop a starting point for a new united Germany.   
The third chapter—“Reunification and the Rise of the Civilian Power”—will 
evaluate German statecraft of the 1990s. The chapter will also include an analysis of the 
realist predictions of a reunited Germany and a brief summary of a German foreign 
policy dominated by realist motives—including requests for a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council and nuclear weapons—and why these predictions never came to 
fruition. Using scholarly analysis and primary source statements, the chapter will 
evaluate German support for the integration of the EU and the rise to civilian power. The 
chapter will use events such as the Maastricht Treaty (1992), Balkan Wars (1993-1999), 
and NATO/EU enlargement to support the theme of the rise to civilian power status. The 
chapter will also lay out the key themes of the evolution of the policy of reconciliation.   
The third chapter—“The Emerging Great Power”—will evaluate Germany’s 
continued support for EU integration, especially surrounding the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the 
European Union (EU) army. This chapter will briefly evaluate case studies of the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009), Iraq War (2003), and Libya (2011) to support the observation of the 
Germany government’s increasing autonomy of action in foreign policy. This chapter 
will also evaluate the shift within the German government to pursue a more realist 
foreign policy using geo-economic power to advance its interests in the EU. The chapter 
will also highlight the division of the German government’s global ambitions and the 
lack of domestic support. The chapter will also evaluate the German Defense Minister 
Ursula von der Leyen’s statements from the Munich Security Conferences (2014-15) and 
her statements about security and defense policy and the Bundeswehr.  
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The fifth chapter—“Conclusion”—will assess the evolution of Germany’s 
security and defense policy since unification and compare patterns and trend against the 
initial predictions of the realist theory of international relations. This chapter will also 
summarize the evolution of Germany’s integration in the EU and rise to civilian power 
then to geo-economic power and to now—as a normal, confident middle power emerging 
as a great power. The chapter will consider how geopolitical realities will contend with 
the political ambitions of the German government. The conclusion will also assess the 
impact of a more powerful Germany—ready to lead from the centre—has on the current 
world order. 
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II. THE PRELUDE TO REUNIFICATION: POLICY OF 
RECONCILIATION  
This chapter examines the record of the 1864-1871 unification of Germany under 
Prussia. This event led to the emergence of a powerful Germany that disrupted the 
European order since 1815. Further, this chapter highlights what is called die deutsche 
Mittellage—Germany’s central position in the map of the European continent—to 
understand the basic geopolitical considerations that remain true today when analyzing 
German security and defense policy. In his contemporary reprise of geopolitics that 
quotes from Bismarck, Robert Kaplan observes that, “Precisely because they have 
occupied the center of Europe as a land power, Germans have always demonstrated a 
keen awareness of geography and strategy as a survival mechanism.”10  
Though a review of the period between World War I—including the Weimar 
Republic—and the surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945 are largely absent from this thesis. 
This is not because it is not important to the German story, but this author can assume 
that these events are so well known as to be generalized, and the size of this thesis cannot 
accommodate a total history of modern Germany. Further, the weight of the German 
catastrophe—as it was formerly called in the wake of 1945—the Federal Republic has 
consciously attempted to break with the statecraft of 1871 until 1945 that ended in this 
disaster. The collective memories of the Holocaust and the Nazi atrocities during the war 
do play heavily in the aftermath following the surrender in 1945, and the influence that 
these collective memories have on foreign and security policy are more important to this 
thesis.  
Beginning in 1945, West German foreign and security policy centered on the 
politics of reconciliation at first with the western powers and, later, with the Soviet realm 
with the goals of regaining sovereignty, ensuring security, and ultimately achieving 
reunification. This policy shaped domestic and international perceptions about post-
World War II Germany’s place in the world, and eventually, the policy allowed a united 
                                                 
10 Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and 
the Battle against Fate (New York: Random House, 2012), 15. 
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Germany to return to influence international affairs and a position of respect in the family 
of nations. The West German government’s steadfast support of multilateralism and 
increasing integration in European institutions and NATO are examples of how these 
processes served to support reconciliation by reassuring the Western nations that 
Germany no longer represented a threat to the hard won peace.11 The decision to rearm 
the FRG in the mid-1950s and the its role as a key piece of NATO’s Western European 
collective security allowed the FRG to regain important aspects of national sovereignty. 
The chapter will also address the conflicting—while also complementary—reconciliation 
policies of Westbindung and Ostpolitik adopted as part of the path to reunification from 
the middle 1960s until 1989 to develop a starting point for the security and defense 
policies of a united Germany. Although important to a larger examination of security 
policy, this thesis does not examine the policies of the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) because the most continuity can be found between the policies of the FRG across 
time before and after reunification.   
A. BISMARCK AND THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY 
The epoch of peace in Europe after 1945, the rapid democratization of Central 
Europe after 1990, and the increased globalization of capitalism that further economically 
integrated the world economies created a wave of optimism that led the now Stanford 
professor, Francis Fukuyama, to declare “the end of history.”12 From the perspective of 
the crisis in the year 2016, a certain irony adheres to this now quaint idea, whereby an 
understanding of the story of Germany’s role in the European system of states in the 
classical period is in order. The term “balance of power” had—until recently—become 
sort of taboo when describing the geopolitical situation in now peaceful and integrated 
Europe. The use of the phrase balance of power to describe the politics in Europe may 
have passed out of fashion in contemporary times as the focus on European integration 
and the spread of liberal democratic ideals became the dominant drivers of German 
                                               
11 Claus Hofhansel, Multilateralism, German Foreign Policy, and Central Europe. (New York: 
Routledge, 2005),16. 
12 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?" The National Interest (Summer 1989), 10.  
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foreign policy of the past quarter century. However, the theory behind the importance of 
balance of power politics has endured despite the declining popularity of the term.13  
Robert Kaplan states that the spread of democracy does not portend that nations’ 
foreign policies will become more enlightened than the dictatorships they replaced.14 The 
specter of the balance of power politics from the 17th century until the Cold War still 
haunts international power politics today. The notable international relations theorist, 
Hans Morgenthau, elaborates on this principle:  
The balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only 
inevitable, but an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign 
nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is due 
not to the faultiness of the principle, but to the particular conditions under 
which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign states.15 
It is important to understand the effect that a powerful united Germany has had on 
the international system of states in Europe, where the balance of power politics emerged 
in the 18th century as a principle of statecraft. To illustrate this conclusion, one easily 
reflects back on the birth of the mid-19th century balance of power, and the consequence 
that the 1866–1871 consolidation of the many fragmented Germanic kingdoms under 
Prussia had on Europe. When Otto von Bismarck took the appointment of minister-
president of Prussia in 1862, there was no nation state of Germany but the post 1815 and 
post 1848 duality between Berlin and Vienna.16 At that time, “Germany” was a loosely 
tied together political organization—called  the German Confederation—set up at Vienna 
in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo in 1815.17 
 When compared against the enormous land empire of Russia or the great naval 
power of Great Britain, the kingdom of Prussia was a relatively small nation that could 
                                               
13 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated edition, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2014), 341. 
14 Kaplan, Revenge, 25. 
15 Hans Joachim Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New 
York: Knopf; [distributed by Random House, 1972), 125. 
16 Donald Abenheim, Associate Professor of European Security at Naval Postgraduate School, in 
discussion with author, March 3, 2016. 
17 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 289. 
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barely be considered among the great powers in Europe. However, its key role in the 
defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo under General Blücher won it great power status as one 
of the five guarantors of the peace outlined in the Treaties of Paris (1814-15).18 The 1817 
Treaty at Chaumont introduced the term great power, as post-Napoleonic Europe 
recognized Prussia as one of the great powers of the time.19  
Bismarck—an instinctive Realpolitiker—recognized that a nation’s power was 
measured by both its actual and potential military and economic strength and its 
reputation.20 With an eye to the order constructed in absolutism and further codified in 
Metternich’s time, he understood the path to power for the Prussian Empire was to unite 
the Germanic kingdoms under a single Reich without the Hapsburgs. The order of nations 
created by the Congress of Vienna led to the consolidation of a plethora of Germanic 
kingdoms into around thirty German-speaking states.21 The Revolutions of 1848—with 
the revival of nationalism and liberalism broken free from the bonds put on it by 
Metternich and the Holy Alliance in 1815—captured the rising spirit of nationalism 
amongst the Germanic people. Bismarck sought to capitalize on the sentimentalities for 
the benefit of Prussia. The unification process began in earnest in 1864. Austria and 
Prussia united to attack Denmark for the German speaking duchies of Holstein and 
Schleswig. Soon after, Bismarck, unhappy with Austria concerning the new acquisitions 
the German Confederation, perceived the weakness of the Austrian Empire and sought to 
seize on the opportunity to expand Prussian power. The culmination of the Austrian War 
of 1866 was the amalgamation of many of these fragmented kingdoms into the Northern 
German Confederation under Prussia, thus, paving the way for further consolidation of 
the Germanic world under Prussian control.22   
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With the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71 Germany 
emerged in a dominant role in the European system, which had not the been the case in 
the previous chapters of the balance since 1648. Undoing what Louis XIV had done, 
Bismarck regained the coveted territories of the Alsace-Lorraine extending the border of 
Germany from the Rhine to the Vosges mountains to secure the Reich in the west.23 The 
war also united the other princely houses creating the Second Reich as a modern German 
nation state. The rise of German power and the decline of France grossly revised the 
precarious balance of power in Europe built on the Congress of Vienna following the 
Napoleonic Wars with Bismarck’s Europe in which France was isolated and Habsburg 
and Romanov were tied, at least for a while, to Berlin.24  The British Prime Minister at 
the time, Benjamin Disraeli, declared in a speech to the House of Commons in 1871, 
“This war represents the German Revolution…a greater political event than the French 
Revolution…you have a new world…the balance of power has been entirely 
destroyed.”25 The years following Bismarck’s death proved that the complex balance of 
power in Europe required a statesmen of Bismarck’s talent. Craig claims that the 
“nervousness and maladroitness” of German foreign policy after Bismarck from 1888 
until 1914 left Europe much more unstable and fragile.26  
These events reflected how the geographic position—termed Mittellage—in the 
center of Europe has governed German international relations. Friedrich Ratzel, an 
influential German scholar of geopolitics in the late-19th century, spoke of the so-called 
conditio Germanae—or curse of the central position—meant that a weak Germany would 
be the battleground of the great powers, but a strong Germany that dominated the coveted 
Mitteleuropa (European Heartland) could secure adequate Lebensraum (living space) to 
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become a Grossmacht (great power) in its own right.27 The foreign policy of Bismarck 
emerged from these geopolitical limits in freedom it faced. In order to increase its own 
security in the European order with the possibility of French revenge for 1870, the 
Prussian and then the Second Reich‘s focused its foreign policy on the European 
heartland.28   
Gordon Craig notes that—in contrast to Britain, France and Italy—Bismarck was 
constrained from participating in “adventures in exotic and exciting areas remote from 
the nation’s main sphere of influence.”29 In the age of imperialism in the 1880s, 
Bismarck himself remarked to those who believed that Germany should look for 
colonies, “Your map of Africa is very beautiful, but my map of Africa is in Europe. Here 
is Russia and here is France, and here we are in the middle. That is my map of Africa.”30 
The statement reflects an important observation—since the beginning, Germany’s 
vulnerable position in the center of Europe and its continental orientation have been a 
core of its foreign policy, and this fact remains true even today in a globalized world of 
interlocking crises and German and European interest in the global economy. This glance 
back at the unification of Germany in the 19th century helps to build a foundation for the 
importance to security policy of the geopolitical realities of Germany’s central location in 
Europe. Germany’s position has historically focused its foreign policy on the European 
heartland, and it has reduced the importance of foreign policy foci outside of the 
European continent. Bismarck’s map of Africa is still valid today. 
B. INTEGRATION AND MULTILATERALISM FOR SOVEREIGNTY 
The Second World War had claimed the lives of at least 17 million combatants 
killed in action and at least 18 million non-combatants.31 The destruction of six long 
years of total war left most of Europe in ruins. The Columbia University historian, Mark 
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Mazower explains that, “not surprisingly, feelings of intense bitterness and ‘morbid 
hatred’ against the Germans were widespread when the war ended.”32 The discovery of 
the Nazi atrocities against the Jews, and the birth of the atomic age left little faith in the 
ability of Europe to maintain a peaceable existence for the future. The lessons drawn 
from the war were that the victors must create a new world order for a chance of peace. 
The result was that, in the midst of the war, President Roosevelt—with the agreements of 
Churchill and Stalin—ordered the unconditional surrender and enduring punishment of 
the offending nations, and thus, created a new world system to keep order in the post war 
world.33  
The result for Germany was the division and occupation of the country by the 
winning allied powers—the United States, France, United Kingdom, and the Soviet 
Union. Famine, uncertainty, millions of Germans expelled from other nations, the crimes 
against humanity, and genocide filled the immediate years after the defeat. The Allies 
adopted a policy of de-Nazification though the process took different forms on each side 
of divided Germany. De-Nazification included both trials for war crimes and reeducation 
programs for German youth. As part of the consequences of the de-Nazification effort, 
the Allies forced the German people to repudiate their anti-democratic and militaristic 
past and to reevaluate their present. The results were recognition of the victims and an 
acceptance of the guilt for the Nazi atrocities.34  
The Christian Democratic former mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer assumed 
the Chancellery in Bonn in 1949 of an occupied West German state with limited 
sovereignty. The Allies divided Germany into east and west, and these two states became 
organized as the Cold War deepened in 1948-1949 in the middle of Europe. Adenauer 
accepted the truth that the path to sovereignty for the West Germans was through 
reconciliation first with the Western Allies and to integrate West Germany into the cause 
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of western European and Atlantic unity.35 Adenauer’s goal was the so-called 
Westbindung, unfulfilled in the Weimar Republic by Gustav Stresemann, as the answer to 
national weakness and division.36 A policy of strength with the west would lead to 
national unity when the Soviets retreated from their over-extended position on the Elbe. 
Eventually, during the détente from the late 1960s until the middle 1970s the conditions 
in the Cold War would allow a chance for reconciliation with the eastern nations as well.  
The policy of reconciliation that dominated the West German foreign and security 
policy had three main goals—regaining sovereignty, attaining security, and eventual 
reunification of Germany. The political scientist Claus Hofhansel declares, “in 1949 
Federal Republic was not a sovereign or even a semisovereign state but an occupied 
country.”37 Regaining this sovereignty was Adenauer primary concern, and he 
understood that sovereignty could only be won through a comprehensive policy of 
reconciliation including integration with the Western nations. The Allied Occupation 
Statute promised Germany “the maximum possible degree” of self-government, but the 
allies were constantly pressuring the fledgling government concerning policy—especially 
about issues of reparations and reconciliation with victims of Nazi war crimes.38  These 
issues of reconciliation influenced heavily in the questions of a return of German 
sovereignty or furthering integration with the Western Allies—both central goals at the 
time.39 
The goals of regaining sovereignty and attaining security happened to coincide 
into an opportunity to advance both goals in the first decade of the FRG. The first order 
of business was to set Germany down the path to integrate increasingly in multilateral 
institutions in Europe to regain acceptance to the family of nations. Adenauer understood 
that to ever regain its sovereignty, the German government would have accept some 
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temporary restraints to that sovereignty.40 The so-called Westbindung—or increasing 
integration with the West—policy assumed that to regain its sovereignty, the German 
government would have to reconcile primarily with France and the Benelux countries, 
and then demonstrate itself as a reliable partner to the other allies in collective defense 
with NATO.41  The first important step in this process of integration and multilateralism 
was the Schumann Plan and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC)—the precursor of the European Union. The Schumann Plan was able to link the 
key industrial bases of a war economy with France providing both a measure of security 
for France and a vital industrial market for Germany. The importance of the Schumann 
Plan was beyond economics was that it increased West Germany’s sovereignty by its 
status equal partner nation with France in the ECSC.42 
C. THE REALPOLITIK OF THE POST-WAR ORDER 
The post-war security situation in Europe had also become an immediate concern 
for West Germany. Hopes for unity among the victors did not last, and relations between 
the Allies and the Soviet Union quickly began to deteriorate after 1945 as the conflict of 
democratic capitalism and authoritarian communism ideologies moved to the forefront of 
the new Cold War in international politics. From unification in 1871 to defeat in 1945, 
Germany had enjoyed a powerful position in the center of Europe.43 Now the West 
Germans found themselves and the nation divided once more into parts as prior to 1871 
and on the eastern edge of Western Europe. Their location placed the West Germans as 
the frontline bulwark against the Soviet Union’s Red Army and spread of communism. 
The importance of West Germany’s position geographically and ideologically on the 
strategic battlefront against communism was not lost on the United States—or on the 
newly formed West German government.   
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The question of rearming West Germany became a central theme in early NATO 
politics and a key source of bargaining power for Konrad Adenauer, especially as the 
USSR created a new German army under cover in the Soviet Zone from 1948 until 
1952.44 The eventual plan required a West German commitment to raise the West 
German Army, the Bundeswehr, of 500,000 men, and in return, Adenauer had secured a 
full membership status in a European Defense Community (EDC) as well as NATO and a 
restoration of much of the lost sovereignty of West Germany back to the German 
government.45 The new nation manifested the pain of national division behind the plan of 
its chief figure, Konrad Adenauer—to integrate the Rhine Republic into the western 
community and to engage national unity from an eventual roll back of communist power 
in Central Europe. This task required association with the emerging Atlantic alliance, that 
is, NATO, founded one month before the FRG in April 1949. At its inception, the 
mission of NATO, as famously attributed to the first NATO Secretary General, Lord 
Ismay, was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”46 
Alternatively, more appropriately put, NATO’s original strategy focused on the stability 
and collective defense of Western Europe against Soviet Union (USSR) with the 
integration of West Germany with the Western nations buttressed by an enduring US 
defense commitment.47   
Politically the decision to arm the FRG and to join the EDC and NATO was 
obviously positive and necessary, but Adenauer faced strong criticism from the German 
people who were wary of war and militarism with very good reason. The policy 
reconciliation developed domestically into an antimilitaristic approach to security and 
defense policy. Starting what would become a trend of dissention between the general 
German public and the ambitions of the government, a poll conducted in 1950 found the 
67% of those polled were against rearmament or to service in the military.48 In order to 
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promote the idea of a new army on a constitutional basis for those who had been abused 
in the Wehrmacht as well as to solve longstanding problems of checks and balances in 
statecraft —the Bundeswehr developed under a concept of civilian in uniform approach 
to military leadership or Innere Führung.49 
Through the efforts of all the Alliance members, NATO successfully achieved its 
stated goals in Germany until unity in 1990. After the destruction of World War II, the 
full participation of the United States on an enduring basis was critical to ensure stability 
in the fragile continent of Europe. To this end, the United States maintained a 
commitment of around 250,000 troops in West Germany for nearly four decades as well 
as forces elsewhere.50 US military leadership of NATO was a balancing force to the 
nationalistic politics that contributed to the causes of two world wars, an occupation that 
John Mearsheimer refers to as an “offshore balancer.”51  
Although not a founding member of NATO in 1949, West Germany found a place 
as an equal partner under the Alliance security umbrella after five years of diplomatic 
struggle. NATO integrated West Germany into the defense structure from 1955 until 
1965, and quickly became the bulwark of the forward defense in Western Europe.52 The 
separation of Germany into East and West and the eventual building of the Berlin Wall in 
1961 became the physical representation of Churchill’s Iron Curtain—the symbolic 
dividing line of the Cold War.53   
Rather than keeping the Germans down, NATO allowed West Germany to fully 
participate as a member of the alliance. German participation in NATO evolved as the 
strategic vision of NATO has been redefined throughout the decades. During the Cold 
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War, West Germany was strategically positioned on the front lines of the NATO defense. 
NATO’s collective defense role allowed Germany to rearm and maintain a sizeable 
military presence without violating the provisions of self-defense enshrined the Basic 
Law. The nature of the NATO alliance supported a defensive only role for Germany. This 
allowed the German military to rearm under conditions contained by the strength of the 
NATO allies, mainly the United States.   
The third goal of the policy of reconciliation was ultimately to achieve the 
reunification of West and East Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany was 
officially founded in 1949 with the ratification of the temporary Basic Law—and in the 
preamble the goal of reunification of Germany is implied by stating that this is a 
“transitional period,” and that the Basic Law is “acted also on behalf of those Germans to 
whom participation was denied,” namely the East Germans.54 The Basic Law survived 
reunification, as envisioned in Article 146 and remains in effect today.55 The policy of 
reconciliation included an understanding that amends would not only have to occur with 
the western nations but also with the nations on the other side of the Iron Curtain—
especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union—if the goal of reunification 
was ever to be realized. 
Once the period of Westbindung gave way to détente in the 1960s, the enduring 
symbol of German reconciliation in Eastern Europe is the vision of German Chancellor 
Willy Brandt kneeling before the monument for the victim of the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising on December 7, 1970.56 The picture embodied the détente policies between the 
United States and the Soviet Union that opened the door for Brandt’s easing of tensions 
with the Central European Soviet bloc governments or Ostpolitik.57 The Ostpolitik during 
the détente laid the groundwork that would by the 1980s pave the way for the merger of 
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equals of the GDR into the Federal Republic of Germany. Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik was 
a realist shift to step back from nuclear holocaust and to normalize relations with Central 
Europe. It also represented a change away from the idealistic refusal of the Adenauer 
government to deal with other Central European nations.58  
A consequence of Adenauer’s insistence on Western integration, especially the 
armament of the FRG, was the deepening division of West and East Germany, just as the 
GDR embarked on a Stalinist course even without Stalin. West Germany’s commitment 
to NATO intertwined with the goals of NATO Atlantic Strategy, although a divergence 
of interest operates as well, especially from the perspective of Bonn. Until then, the 
Federal Republic of Germany essentially united—with frictions along the way in the 
Eisenhower era—with NATO policies. However, the unity of policies began to fray with 
the nuclear stalemate at the end of the 1950s.  
In, and by August 1961, the division of Berlin by the Berlin Wall became the 
symbol of the struggle for mastery in Europe. The reconciliation of World War II 
atrocities carried on as Germany had to address claims with Central European 
countries— especially with the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Brandt sought 
to shift the reconciliation policy to revise the Hallstein doctrine and find common ground 
with Central European nations of the Soviet bloc. The Adenauer government adopted the 
so-called Hallstein Doctrine—that the FRG was the sole Germany and the GDR was just 
the Soviet Zone—to delegitimize the division of Germany as part of a plan to achieve 
reunification. The goal of Ostpolitik after 1969 was also the eventual reunification of the 
two Germanys, but as a requirement to open up dialogue with the GDR, Brandt had 
officially to recognize the division of Germany and the sovereignty and borders of the 
Eastern European nations.59 
Germany’s defeat and surrender to the Allies at the conclusion of WWII presented 
the German government and people with an opportunity to recreate a democratic nation, 
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but there was no zero hour for the German people.60 Lily Gardner Feldman, Senior 
Fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins 
University, notes that the central theme of German foreign policy after WWII was a 
political and moral process of progressive reconciliation, but that public opinion and the 
government were often divided on the proper approach to reconciliation.61 Germany had 
to atone for the physical and emotional damages forced on their victims after seven brutal 
years of death and destruction, but often the ambitions of political leaders like Adenauer 
and Brandt were far ahead of public opinions of reconciliation.62 
The post-heroic idealism of Chancellor Adenauer secured the Federal Republic of 
Germany’s sovereignty in return for western integration, and the vision of Chancellor 
Brandt and the Ostpolitik that laid the foundation for the eventual reunification of 
Germany in 1990.63 The result was a German nation that had integrated itself fully into 
multilateral institutions of collective defense and economic trade blocks. In addition to 
military security, the US funded Marshall Plan in 1947 provided the funding to 
economically rebuild the devastated continent. The strong US engagement in security 
over the decades helped to create the stable conditions that fostered increased European 
economic integration culminating in the European Coal and Steel Community, the 
precursor to the European Union.64 Germany’s prosperity depended on enhancing trade 
relationships with the world and slowly earning readmission to the family of nations, 
especially in Europe.65 By demonstrating its reliability as an equal partner, Germany also 
earned a level of respect in the international arena as a civilian power.66 
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III. REUNIFICATION AND THE RISE OF THE CIVILIAN 
POWER 
The success of the policy of reconciliation allowed Germany to achieve the three 
primary foreign and security policy goals of maintaining security, regaining sovereignty, 
and ultimately, reunification. During the forty-five years since the defeat of Germany in 
1945, the policy of reconciliation demonstrated to the world of Germany’s commitment 
to the Kantian liberal ideologies of democracy, economic integration, and international 
institution, which earned Germany a respected reputation of peaceful diplomacy in the 
international community.67 In the prelude to German unity in 1989–1990, not all were 
confident that a unified Germany would maintain its peaceful existence since the close of 
World War II. The reunification made Germany over night the most populous nation and 
the nation with the highest economic output in what would soon become the European 
Union—eclipsing both France and the United Kingdom. Certain scholars—as well as 
leading European leaders—believed that a united Germany would be incompatible with 
European unity.68 There were even unfounded concerns among those more at home with 
theory than aware of the realities of war and peace in Central Europe that a new powerful 
Germany would seek to secure a nuclear arsenal of their own.69 These beliefs were in line 
with how scholars believe great powers will behave under the widely cited international 
relations theory of realism.   
The concept of realism expects that the international system will remain anarchic, 
that states will seek to increase their power, and that great powers will compete for power 
against other powers all in an effort to gain more security.70 International relations 
theorists divide realism into defensive realism—the quest to gain more security—and 
offensive realism—the quest to gain more power. A united Germany had in the past been 
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held accountable as disrupter of the delicate balance of power and ultimately the cause of 
two devastating world wars. The German Question that once captured the concerns of 
British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was again brought to the forefront of 
Europeans’ minds.   
In a view that was also widely held in Washington, DC at the time, realists 
scholars like University of Chicago political scientist and founder of offensive realism, 
John J. Mearsheimer, were concerned that a unified Germany would quickly rise to 
power and prove to be a destabilizing force in Europe. He believed that Germany would 
grasp nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer added that the future implied goal of NATO would 
continue as a means to provide security for Germany so that Germany would not be 
tempted to militarize further, and it recognizes that continued US engagement in Europe 
through NATO also provides security to the other NATO members from a possible 
resurgence of German power.71 This would become one of the unstated goals of the 
sustainment of NATO in Europe despite the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
To the chagrin of realists like Mearsheimer, Germany in the 1990s more or less 
disarmed, reducing its forces in size to what today is too small a level and embracing a 
policy of NATO enlargement as the core of its defense policy that remained within 
NATO. The Bonn government in the 1990s maintained its campaign of multilateralism 
and centered its foreign and security policy on promoting the rule of law in the 
international system and building economic integration within, what after 1992, became 
the European Union. German commitment to multilateralism and a continued 
denunciation of the use of military power actually stabilized much of Central Europe 
during a potentially dangerous time of epic transformation. The new Germany continued 
most previous West German policies—including reconciliation with the emerging 
democratic governments of Central Europe. Germany was a strong supporter of increased 
European integration that would solidify the European Common Market into the 
European Union and eventually created a borderless Schengen Zone and a single 
currency area—the Eurozone.   
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Germany’s commitment to pacifism was tested when the continent was again 
haunted by genocide—this time in the former Yugoslavia. Germany desired to 
continually act within multinational security institutions like the UN, NATO, and the 
OSCE, but the re-emergence of ethnic conflict revealed that the EU was unable to 
respond appropriately without American military assistance. This realization of 
inadequacy and the growing sentiment in Europe to act with more freedom from US 
influence furthered the ambitious plan to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
of the European Union (CSFP).72 Overtime, a change began in the determinants of 
Germany’s foreign and security policy as the German government came to embrace its 
new position of power and began to express more freedom of political maneuver. This 
dichotomy of positioning for more freedom of maneuver outside of the American 
controlled Atlantic alliance and the lack of cohesion and a credible military force 
between the EU members has left Germany with little choice but to pursue a more 
independent foreign and security policy.73 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIVILIAN POWER 
Sebastian Harnisch, Professor of International Relations and Foreign Policy at the 
University of Heidelberg, suggests that post-unification Germany pursued the path of a 
civilian power, which, according to Harnisch, seeks to gain a monopolization of force 
within collective security institutions and uses mainly non-violent means to achieve 
foreign policy aims.74 However, Harnisch also interestingly notes that although Germany 
has sought peaceful means to achieve policy goals that does not mean that civilian 
powers are always successful or that they regularly promote ‘good causes.’75 Douglas 
Webber, Professor of Political Science at INSEAD, agrees and states that the Bonn 
government renounced military force as a method of advancing West German foreign 
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policy and that unified Germany initially maintained a defense only policy towards the 
use of military force. Nevertheless, as the Soviet Union fell, people’s mixed collective 
memories could not forget the atrocities of World War II, and they were still wary of a 
powerful reunited Germany.76   
The Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, Hans 
Kundnani claims that Germany became a civilian power, which unlike a great power, 
seeks to influence international norms to “civilize” international relations.77 Kundnani 
echoes the scholarship of Professor of International Relations at Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, Hanns Maull, who argued that Germany, like Japan, emerged from the defeat 
of World War II, as “a new type of international power” that embraces cooperation and 
economic means to advance its foreign policy goals.78 The Germans were committed to a 
policy of increased use of a statecraft that came to be called civilian power and a pursuit 
of further integration with the other European nations.79 This approach allowed Germany 
to grow in relative power without alarming its critics with militaristic visions from the 
past. 
The new unified German government, in an effort to demonstrate its commitment 
to Europe, sought to strengthen relationships within the European Community. Amid the 
leadership of Chancellor (1982-1998) Helmut Kohl (CDU) and Foreign Minister (1974-
1992) Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), the German government strongly supported the 
development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Kohl set 
out to ease the fears of his allies by having Germany work within the framework of the 
EU, and working to align German foreign policy within the EU context.80 The Germans 
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knew that only by working within a multilateral framework, backed by legitimized 
international support—like the UN—would the international community be less wary of 
a more powerful Germany.   
Cold War Germany and Western Europe mainly found security under the NATO 
and US defense umbrella. Many external factors influenced the German attitude toward 
war and peace in the epoch of post-unification. The threat from the USSR represented a 
threat that could only be countered only by the military might of the United States, but 
the by December 1991, the USSR collapsed, and it was too entangled in the revolution of 
its own rebirth to represent a threat to NATO. By the end of 1991, the Gulf War had been 
fought and a war of Yugoslav succession was beginning, but these could be said to have 
minimal impact on German interests in that year.   
Many believed that the end of the Cold War would usher in a new world order of 
liberal democracies that would create a lasting peace—the end of history according to 
Fukuyama.81 However, as the changing world order revealed that many crises emerged 
from “the permafrost of superpower confrontation.”82 This lacuna was especially evident 
as the ethnically driven conflict in Yugoslavia that manifested itself from 1991 onwards. 
The Germans hoped that they could navigate the post-Cold War security environment as 
a power with less military might but a good deal of civilian and economic power. The 
Germans embraced a concept of smart power combining diplomatic, cultural, and 
economic factors supported by a capable military that could be effectively wielded to 
enhance security. Smart power is a concept that combines both hard power—military 
power and economic sanctions—and soft power—the power of a nation’s culture to 
affect change.83 A diplomatic solution to the Yugoslav war could not be reached by the 
European powers alone, and the only course of action was to execute a humanitarian 
mission to stop a potential genocide. 
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Germany knew that for the European Union to contribute to international security, 
it would still need a capable military force to support foreign policy. In the wake of the 
Cold War, the European Community wanted to establish itself as a credible political actor 
on the international stage.84 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 outlined the basic ideas 
behind the establishment of a more political European Union, and it laid the foundation 
for one of the key pillars—the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 
European Union wanted to tackle two important issues in the post-Cold War era. First, 
the EU wanted to establish a cohesive foreign policy that the Europeans could offer the 
international community. Second, the EU sought to prevent a possible security vacuum 
caused by the eventual reduction of United States forces in Europe the EU’s willingness 
to assume a larger share of the burden for European security.85  
Alister Miskimmon, the Director of European Studies at the University of 
London, uses a theme of Europeanisation to explain the processes behind the 
development of EU foreign and security policy and by implication, the role of Germany 
in such a process. He noted that states that participate in the process both “upload” and 
“download” foreign and security policy constraints and objectives.86 The member states 
then adapt their own foreign and security policies within these constraints and objectives. 
Thus further uploading, downloading, and adapting occur in a continuous feedback loop 
in the policy development. This cycle forces member states to balance carefully the 
external demands on the EU by the larger international community, the demands within 
the EU amongst member states, and the demands of their own constituents.87 Within this 
context, Germany was able to use its growing power to influence policy in the European 
Union, which created an amplifying effect of downloaded German foreign policy goals 
advanced through the CFSP. Moreover, when the EU proved incongruent with German 
goals, Germany could still act bilaterally, as it has in its continued pursuit of bilateral 
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relations that has prompted some analysts to question Germany’s commitment to 
fostering European unity in foreign and security policy matters.88 
Finding a balance between national sovereignty and intergovernmental decisions 
is difficult politics. Not only due member states’ politicians have to tip-toe the lines along 
the traditionally sovereign territory of sensitive issues like foreign and security policy, 
but they have to satisfy the constituents of their own nation by pursuing national interests 
and reducing expenditures. Playing to the shifting interests of their national voters is a 
particularly difficult task for the German political leaders when negotiating a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. Often the German government was moving ahead of the 
popular attitude of the constituents. A series of Eurobarometers indicate that in 1989, just 
ahead of unification, popular sentiments in the FRG aligned with the policy aims of the 
German government, at least in regards to a common EU foreign security and defense 
policy. The trend consistently increased during the lead up to the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty indicating a clear majority of those polled—seventy-five  percent were 
in favor of “foreign policy towards others countries” should be decided by the EU and 
fifty-five percent supported the opinion that “security and defense policy” should be 
decided by the EU.89 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 outlined the basic ideas behind the establishment 
of a federative state with greater sovereign powers, European Union, and it laid the 
foundation for the CFSP.90 Through intergovernmentalism, the European nations 
surrendered some of the realm traditionally held within national sovereignty in support of 
maintaining peace and prosperity. France had traditionally dominated European politics 
while Germany exerted more influence over economic and monetary policy, but 
Germany now assumed a larger role politically than before unification.91  Helmut Kohl 
said, “For us Germans there are no niches in world politics, and Germany should not be 
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able to evade its responsibilities.”92 Kohl and the German government took this mindset 
to the negotiations at Maastricht, and the result was the creation of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy of the European Union. The CFSP became an intergovernmental 
pillar of the EU that stated, “Member states shall support the Union’s external and 
security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”93 
The European vision of military security was pinned on the Western European Union, but 
the European Union was still not ready to provide a credible military security option 
outside of NATO—and not without the assistance of American military might as became 
manifest in Bosnia in 1994 and the decision in 1995 to enlarge NATO.   
B. GERMANY, NATO, AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY 
POLICY 
Germany increased economic integration during the 1990s culminating in the 
establishment of the Eurozone (January 1, 1999); Germany also supported the 
establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).94 In the wake of the 
Cold War, the European Union wanted to establish itself as a credible political actor on 
the international stage in defense of liberal ideals such as safeguarding human rights and 
providing humanitarian aid.95 One of the main concerns within the nations during the 
1990s debates about the Common Foreign Security Policy was whether an EU defense 
policy would jeopardize the current NATO security framework.96  
The Europeans recognized that NATO had effectively maintained security in 
Europe during the Cold War, and for some members of the EU—mainly the United 
Kingdom—there was little need for the EU to create a security and defense policy outside 
of NATO or beyond the embers own national policies. There was much friction between 
the three big powers and the United States. There were those in the American 
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government skeptical of German embrace of France in the EU as well as a French 
attempt to rejoin the NATO integrated military structure amid the ambition to create 
CFSP. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright famously categorized this skepticism in 
the 3 Ds: no decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination.97  
The United Kingdom wanted to maintain the current strong transatlantic alliance 
with the North American partners and to reduce redundancies with NATO and the 
Western European Union (WEU).98 France—always a bit aloof within the NATO 
structure—wanted more European autonomy of security and defense as a way to further 
build the EU to great power status.99 Germany sought to balance both views by using the 
CFSP to strengthen the EU foreign and security policy without negatively affecting the 
NATO security relationship. Chancellor Kohl envisaged a stronger role for the EU within 
NATO. He believed that by creating more solidarity under a new European political 
Union, that the EU could show the United States that the Europeans were ready to 
shoulder more of their own security and to contribute more effectively to NATO.100   
The end of the Cold War signaled a rapid draw down of European military forces 
as the potential for great power conflict in Europe subsided. The united Germany chose 
to sustain the policies of the FRG and pursue a peaceful path partially because of the 
legacy of the epoch of total war and also because unity required Germany to more or less 
disarm to a much lower level than the state of forces in October 1990 as part of the Two 
Plus Four negotiations.101 The unification included a general disarmament and partial 
assimilation of the East German soldiers (NVA Nationale Volksarmee [National People’s 
Army]) into the Bundeswehr. Abenheim commends the Bundeswehr’s adherence to the 
leadership concept of Innere Führung for the successful—though not perfect—
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integration of former NVA soldiers and officers into the Bundeswehr.102 The success 
allowed Germany to remain a key strategic partner in NATO even with an agreed total 
troop reduction to 370,000 down from the nearly 600,000 soldiers maintained in garrison 
until October 1990.103 
As the Soviet threat receded, the Gulf War and the Yugoslav crises arose, and 
NATO redefined itself as a crisis management capable force due to the lack of a credible 
security alternative in Europe.104 Until this time, NATO had not been primarily a crisis 
management force meant to provide general economic security. The Europeans wanted a 
force capable of out of area operations to ensure security in places like Africa without 
having to convince the United States to intervene. A European force also allows for a 
more European approach to crisis management that may provide other options different 
from the dominant US-centric security paradigm, but as Yale Professor of Political 
Science Jolyon Howorth notes, “the forging a common European strategic culture is 
probably the greatest challenge facing the CSDP.”105 
The evolving global security situation continued to evolve with humanitarian 
crises in the Iraq, Somalia, and Rwanda. Germany had been paralyzed by its own war 
guilt from the past and an internal distrust of its newly acquired power after unification. 
A Socialist leader in Germany, Oscar Lafontaine, made a comment “that to ask Germany 
to send troops to the Gulf would be like offering brandied chocolate to a recovering 
alcoholic.”106  However, the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia forced those in Berlin 
to manifest their war pervasive war guilt to motivate necessary military action. Germans 
now recognized that checkbook diplomacy would not earn the government the necessary 
recognition of its rising power amongst the great powers. The decision to participate in 
military airstrikes represented a break from the past. The argument that military action in 
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Kosovo was a German responsibility in order to act against an apparent genocide—
especially in its own European neighborhood. 
The nature of NATO is a defensive alliance intended to protect its members that 
need the assistance of more powerful nations from aggression, specifically from 
aggressive states, and with the demise of the Soviet Union, the most aggressive nation in 
the neighborhood has been declawed. Nevertheless, after the Cold War, the fundamental 
problems of European order endured, even if the end of the USSR seemed to some to 
have eradicated the purpose of NATO. NATO, of course, had kept the United States 
engaged and also offered a framework for Germany, requirements which had not 
vanished at all. The Kosovo crisis revealed that Europe still needed a United States 
military presence to provide security and a credible military option when diplomacy 
failed—even in Europe’s own backyard.107  
Germany continued to show itself as a reliable Alliance member by participating 
in the bombing of Kosovo in 1999. Despite all talk of civilian power as well as endemic 
pacifism, the Schroeder-Fischer government led to the decision to participate in the 
Kosovo airstrikes even in the absence of a UN resolution. The German people felt that 
something must be done to stop the genocide, and this time, “Germans wanted to be on 
the ‘right side.’ ”108 The NATO campaign in Kosovo also presented an opportunity for 
Germany to reaffirm its commitment to the Alliance by participating in an offensive 
capacity. Despite the support to stop an obviously atrocity on its own continent, the fear 
of the past kept the Germans apprehensive about the use of military force. German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer commented concerning the German constraints to the 
use of force, “I am not a friend of using force, but sometimes it is a necessary means of 
last resort. So I am ready to use it if there is no other way. If people are being massacred, 
you cannot mutter about having no [UN Security Council] mandate. You must act.”109 
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The German government’s effort to establish an EU security and defense policy 
outside of NATO also demonstrates a more realist approach to foreign policy. By 
building security options other than NATO, Germany has shaped a security and defense 
policy more in line with its own national interest conveniently shrouded in a multilateral 
partnership. The Germans are responding to the external triggers that threat European 
security, but the threats are not so severe as to invoke a response from NATO. The 
development of an EU option for security and defense also provides a defense option for 
the six non-NATO members of the European Union.  
Enlargement was a theme for both NATO and the EU, 1999 also marked the year 
when the EU admitted the first of the new central European democracies to emerge from 
the former Warsaw Pact. NATO and the EU admitted many countries of the former 
Warsaw Pact in rapid succession from 1999 until 2004 (See Figure 1). Germany and 
NATO shared goals to unite Europe in an economic and political union under a trans-
Atlantic security umbrella in order to sustain the long period of peace.110 The NATO 
enlargement after the Cold War also demonstrated the United States commitment to 
supporting liberal democracy in Europe by placing more European nations under its 
security umbrella.  
The end of the Cold War left many questions in the minds of skeptics of the 
continued relevancy of NATO in Europe. Even with the US force reductions in Europe 
since 1991, the Global War on Terror, and more recently, the ballyhooed ‘Pacific Pivot,’ 
the United States has not reduced its commitment to NATO or European collective 
security.111 Despite reductions in force, the United States assumed a leading role in the 
crisis management of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, as well as took a lead in NATO 
enlargement, and, surely, never withdrew from the Washington Treaty. In fact, as of this 
writing in 2016, there exists a significant reorientation of resources effort—coined the 
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European Reassurance Initiative—to  restore confidence within the Atlantic Alliance to 
face Russian aggression in Ukraine and intervention Syria.112  
Figure 1.  NATO and EU Enlargement Comparison 
NATO Enlargement* EU Enlargement
•Bulgaria (2004) •Bulgaria (2007)
•Croatia (2009) •Croatia (2013) 
•Czech Republic (1999) •Czech Republic (2004) 
•Estonia (2004) •Estonia (2004) 
•Hungary (1999) •Hungary (2004) 
•Latvia (2004) •Latvia (2004) 
•Lithuania (2004) •Lithuania (2004) 
•Poland (1999) •Poland (2004) 
•Romania (2004) •Romania (2007)
•Slovakia (2004) •Slovakia (2004) 
•Slovenia (2004) •Slovenia (2004)   
Adapted from: “Countries.” European Union, accessed on March 5, 2016, 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm & “A short history of NATO,” 
Accessed on March 5, 2016, http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.html  
* Some countries left off for illustrative purposes. 
 
The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era in Europe and the United States of 
omnipresent optimism. The embrace of liberal democracy by many of the former Soviet 
bloc nations in Central Europe and the subsequent invitation and acceptance into the 
European Union and NATO for many of these nations supported some of the optimism. 
Nevertheless, the realities of the evolving security environment and the failure of the 
America’s unipolar moment to quell genocide in Africa and unrest in the Middle East 
tamed the high spirits. The situation in Kosovo proved to be a reminder that American 
engagement in Europe was still needed, and that despite the creation of the CSDP, 
Europe was still unable to provide for its own security. The result is a confusing 
mismatch of conflicting military ambitions. The effort to not duplicate NATO capabilities 
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with EU military ambitions has hindered the EU’s efforts to be a credible security behind 
a wall of impossible bureaucracy and political rhetoric. The bargain made by the Atlantic 
Alliance—that Europe accepted American leadership in return for a security guarantee 
and a voice in setting international law—began to deteriorate.113 The strain of conflicting 
views on Middle East policy would lead Europe’s leading nations—France and 
Germany—to defy American demands while still touting the solidarity of the Alliance. 
The new millennium, the rise of international terrorism, and the Arab question would put 
the solidarity of both the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance to the test.  Most 
recently since 2014, the Bundeswehr has begun to rebuild its weakened force structure on 
the continent of Europe—moving to an all-volunteer professional force and increasing 
the defense budget—in a move that only the most paranoid foresaw in the year 1995.114 
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IV. THE EMERGING GREAT POWER  
On September 11, 2001, the focus of international attention would shift from post-
Cold War optimism to the American declared Global War on Terror. The outcries of 
solidarity ensconced by the French newspaper Le Monde’s headline “We Are All 
Americans Now,” were echoed by Germany’s support for the recommendation to evoke 
Article 5 of the Washington treaty, the only time that Article 5 has been declared.115  But 
demonstrating a lack of confidence in the European allies, the United States President 
George W. Bush, requested only a support role for its NATO allies, and instead sought to 
build an international coalition of the willing to enlist in the newly coined “Global War 
on Terror.” The Bush bipolar attitude of “Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists” fostered disillusion and resentment in Berlin and Paris.116 This dissention 
would come to head during the buildup before the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  
The rising economic power of Germany and the admittance of Central and 
Eastern European nations in the European Union have shifted political leadership of 
Europe east from Paris to Berlin. The episode of dissention of the Iraq invasion in 2003 
was a bilateral stance of Germany with France in the lead. The abstention of support for 
the UN Security Council resolution on Libya was taken by Germany alone, against it 
traditional allies and in line with the abstention votes of Russia and China. The German 
Chancellor, Angela Merkel has emerged as the de facto leader of Europe and she has 
taken the lead during the three major crises to challenge the European Union in the recent 
decade—the Greek debt crisis, the Ukrainian crisis, and the refugee crisis. While the 
outcome of these crises is still undetermined, the realization of the world to the leadership 
of Germany in Europe cannot be denied and must be considered with when working with 
Europe.   
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A. THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY  
The Wars of Yugoslavic Succession in the 1990s formed a significant trigger for 
Germany to support the further development of the CFSP to include a Common Security 
and Defense Policy (CSDP). During the debates in the Bundestag over whether to forgo 
the Basic Law and contribute military assistance in Kosovo Joschka Fischer argued:  
We are in a real conflict between basic values. On the one hand, there is 
the renunciation of force as a vision of a world in which conflicts are 
resolved rationally, through recourse to laws and majority decisions, 
through the constitutional process and no longer through brute force…On 
the other hand, there is the bloody dilemma that human beings may be 
able to survive only with the use of military force. Between solidarity for 
survival and our commitment to non-violence—that is our dilemma.117 
The Bundeswehr finally participated in airstrikes along with NATO partners because at 
the beginning of the crisis in the early 1990s the EU lacked the political will as well as 
the capabilities to act without United States help. This fact highlighted the lack of a 
credible military force for the EU, forcing the European Union to consider with greater 
intent adding a military force to support the EU foreign policy goals. The Balkans 
signified the security dilemma that required more than just the civilian power capabilities 
of the EU. While the German government is not condoning a foreign policy that is more 
militaristic per se, but the Germans and the European Union have come to the realization 
that the de facto leadership role of the foreign policy of the European Union (EU), 
requires a strong military capability to support the foreign policy goals.118   
The EU recognized the limits to foreign policy without a capable military option, 
and this led to the Saint Malo Declaration in 1998. The Saint Malo declaration, with its 
Anglo French entente of a new kind was a step forward towards integrating a capable 
military option into the CFSP.119 The EU needed a military capability to perform crisis 
management operations that were not necessarily within NATO’s purview—mainly in 
Africa where America had little interests. But the Europeans efforts to build and support 
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an EU military force have been constrained by lack of public support for military 
operations and lack of viable economic support. Saint Malo represented the EU’s 
ambitions to further support its own security and defense, and to achieve security in a 
manner independent from the United States.120 In the declaration, the EU stated that the 
EU needs “to play its full role on the international stage,’ ‘to have the capacity for 
autonomous action,’ and ‘to have a strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly.”121 
The EU needed to leverage the capabilities that were built for NATO, and this leverage 
was granted via the Berlin Plus arrangement that allowed NATO members to share 
planning capacity and essentially lease the required materiel to support EU missions until 
the nations could supply the materiel for the EU themselves. The United States was not 
enthusiastic to lend its high-tech gear to relatively poorly trained EU troops without 
proper training.122 
The interesting fact surrounding the Saint Malo declaration was the absence of 
German at the talks. Although Germany—in a partnership with France—had been a 
leading supporter of the development of the CFSP, French and British defense elites 
questioned Germany’s military capabilities and willingness to act.123 German statecraft 
seeks, generally, mutual understanding and a resistance to the use of force. Certain 
academics believe that a culture of atonement and the lessons of defeat as well as German 
interests led to the rise of a no to out of area in the Cold War, which became a policy of 
very limited use of the Bundeswehr outside of Europe since 1990.124  Domestic 
apprehension and constitutional constraints created a foreign policy in which 
expeditionary military operations hardly figured at all because of domestic and 
international reasons.125 Domestic constraints such as public opinion and the Basic Law 
coupled with the original need to defend West Germany summarize the reasons why 
Germany only reluctantly used military force in small steps since 1990. The German 
120 Howorth, Security and Defense Policy, 8. 
121 Ibid, 9. 
122 Ibid, 76. 
123 Hyde-Price, CFSP, 107. 
124 Feldman, Reconciliation, 22. 
125 Ibid, 22. 
40 
government’s concern over the evolving security situation in Europe led to a change in 
the drivers behind the conduct of German foreign policy.  
The German constitutional limitations in Article 87a and Article 24 led the 
Bundeswehr to seek only to operate within a coalition and only with a UN mandate. 
Further, concern exists in Berlin to placate both international and domestic fears about 
German national interests driving EU foreign policy.126  Germany has the strenuous task 
of maintaining a strong commitment to both the transatlantic partnership and the 
European Union. The strong support for NATO, CSDP, and a possible European Army 
manifest this support. But the German enthusiasm for a common EU defense force has 
met the reality of too many political caveats and the limited economic resources of their 
EU members especially as the number of crises has recently overwhelmed all concerned.   
Lisbon Treaty of 2009 introduced a “Solidarity Clause (Art. 222(1)) “and a 
“Mutual assistance clause (Art. 42(7))”127  These statements were meant to complement 
the NATO security umbrella while also including security guarantees to EU members 
that are not part of NATO. Germany supports an EU military policy and force, but it has 
also come to understand the familiar concepts of a capability gap and burden sharing in 
this specific context. The smaller EU nations want to utilize the support of the larger 
countries military and economic power at the best value for their own nation. In addition, 
contemporary external threats will not wait for the development of the EU military to 
reach its full potential. Germany customarily sends its military under the banner of an 
international coalition, but unfortunately, the Germans may not find as much actual 
support for their cause either at home or in the international organizations.  
The EU framework allows the Bundeswehr to operate within a coalition in pursuit 
of European Union policy that are aligned with German national interest. This policy 
satisfies both the German domestic apprehension to support military capabilities and the 
other European nations’ wariness of a powerful German military. The Germans could 
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build up and modernize its equipment to satisfy multiple requirements: NATO, EU, and 
national. The idea of pooling and sharing envisioned at the 1999 NATO Washington 
Summit by the “Berlin Plus” arrangements allows smaller nations to contribute to EU 
security when they would not be able to do so on their own, but the plan also rests on the 
operational status of the promised equipment.128 The lack of common EU standards and 
regulations to maintain the promised materiel for defense signifies a recipe for failure 
when the equipment may be needed most. High-tech German equipment could become 
the standard equipment for many uses to be added to the pooling and sharing reserves for 
crisis management operations a goal that fits with its national economic goals.129  
While some anxious figures still believe a militarily strong Germany could 
represent a potential threat to the world balance of power, especially within Europe, the 
need for such a force is growing rapidly among those with a sane view of policy. The 
counter would be either for Germany to operate unilaterally or within a multilateral 
coalition outside of the EU. The CSDP protects national interests within the framework 
of EU supranational and intergovernmental frameworks that support European 
interest.130 The limitations of national constitutions, public support, and budget 
constraints on the participation of some countries in EU operations may force larger and 
more capable countries to contribute more, but if the policy can provide security and 
defense for all and peace maintained, then the benefits of such a policy may be well 
worth the cost. 
The German government supported both the CFSP and the further development of 
the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU.131 The increased integration of the 
EU security and defense institutions has been a focal point for German security policy. 
The Bundeswehr’s participation in the airstrikes in Kosovo was the first combat action 
for the Bundeswehr since 1945.132 The government used peacekeeping and action within 
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a multilateral coalition to slowly build domestic support for further out-of-area military 
operations.133 
When the Al Qaeda terror attacks against the United States Eastern seaboard 
unfolded in the summer of 2001, Germany reaffirmed its commitment to NATO by 
supporting the Article 5 declaration following the attacks on the United States on 
September 11, 2001. Germany provided and sustained troops in Afghanistan at first on a 
bilateral basis and later with than what became NATO’s ISAF. Germany’s increasing 
focus on security could be part of an effort to assuage perennial American concerns of 
burden sharing and free riding. Arguments requesting more support from European allies 
such as from David Yost: 
the allies have yet to reach a consensus endorsing with specificity the ‘job 
description’ for NATO outlined by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz: ‘Fighting terrorism, which has been so clearly linked to 
weapons of mass destruction, is part of NATO’s basic job description: 
Collective Defense ... Article 5 threats can come from anywhere, in many 
forms.134  
One must say that Wolfowitz enjoyed no particular popularity with German security 
elites, and his own partisanship as a lord of war in 2001 soon backfired in the popular 
backlash  in German domestic politics in 2002–2003 as the Iraqi campaign unfolded.135 
After the initial support for the War on Terror, by 2003 German security policy 
diverged with the policy of the United States. A difference in the American way and the 
European approach to security amid the counter terror campaigns as they matured in the 
first years after the attacks caused the divergence. Germany strongly supported the 
growth of the CSDP, but its ambitions were limited by the EU’s lack of credible military 
capability – hence the Berlin Plus arrangements that are not popular with some other 
NATO nations. Initially following unification, Germany focused foreign policy on 
increasing integration in Europe, but during the 2000s, there was a shift away from 
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multilateral cooperation.136 However, a lack of cooperation and cohesion in EU security 
policy leaves many nations—including Germany—looking for alternatives to NATO and 
CSDP.137 
Initially following unification, Germany foreign policy focused on increasing 
integration in Europe, but during the 2000s, there was a shift away from multilateral 
cooperation.138 In 2002, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was determined to opt 
of the multinational coalition during the Iraq war regardless of a decision on a UN 
resolution.139 The strains in the alliance cohesion and strategic purpose of the US led 
efforts in the Global War on Terrorism have degraded the unity of German and NATO 
policy. Kundnani notes that since reunification, there has been a change in Germany’s 
foreign policy paradigm with the United States, and there is no longer a Cold War 
“codependent but unequal” relationship.140 Donald Abenheim states that any significant 
degradation of the German - American and NATO security structure could have 
“unpredictable consequences” for the current world order of sustained liberal democracy 
and economic prosperity.141 Germany has shown its willingness to stand apart from the 
United States and the NATO alliance as in the 2011 Libyan episode, while still 
reaffirming support to its NATO Article 5 commitments to NATO members in the wake 
of the Russian adventure in Ukraine.142   
Germany’s political leaders are moving towards assuming a larger role in world 
affairs both unilaterally and within the auspices of the EU.143 Germany sought to provide 
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more options for European security by supporting the CFSP and the development of a 
Common Defense and Security Policy (CSDP) in a hope to create a multilateral security 
policy more reflective of a European approach to international affairs. However, lack of 
cohesion and limited military capability have held the program’s efforts to lesser 
magnitude crisis management operations.144   
B. THE RISING ECONOMIC POWER  
Hans Kundnani contended that post-unification Germany has evolved into a so-
called geo-economic power, a term fitted that fits within and which attempts to 
characterize German foreign policy, especially in the last decade. As a geo-economic 
power, Germany has sought to influence other nations’ will using its economic power.145  
Initially, Germany acted like a civilian power through the 1990s by focusing on the 
increased integration of Europe—politically and economically. Kundnani claims that 
since the world economic crisis and the security chaos that has followed Germany has 
increasingly used its economic power to push other European nations to adopt its 
policies.146 Since the recent Euro crisis in Greece, especially, Germany now promotes 
itself as the role-model for fiscal responsibility and believes the solution to the Euro crisis 
is to force other Eurozone economies to accept its lead on austerity economic policies 
based on the Swabian school model.147 
Even this scenario resurrected the fears of the return of the German Sonderweg—
special path. In response to the perceived similarity to the Nazi past, a Der Spiegel cover 
declaring “The German Übermacht” while displaying Chancellor Angela Merkel 
superimposed alongside Nazis on top of the Acropolis in Athens in 1941.148  The 
magazine went to print as the Greek government—most likely out of desperation—even 
brought up claim of unfulfilled reparations from the Nazi occupation of Greece in 1941. 
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But the historical accusations failed to drum up the intended distain for Germany’s strict 
economic policies either within Germany or in the international community, and the 
Germany stuck to the austerity policy and failed to waiver on their belief in austerity. The 
Holocaust has now been Europeanized, and Germany uses a shroud of normalization as a 
“code word” to focus policy in the pursuit of national interests and disagreements with 
Alliance members.149 
Germany has reaffirmed its desire since unification to gain a permanent seat on 
the UN Security Council. Its request was supported by other members of the so-called 
G4—Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan—that believe that the current UN Security 
Council does not reflect the current world situation. The request was met with skepticism 
from the current permanent members of the UN Security—United States, Russia, China, 
United Kingdom, and France—that were appointed in the wake of World War II in 
1946.150  Germany is the third largest contributor to the UN, and currently considered a 
leader in Europe. However, a simultaneous competing desire to gain a permanent 
European Union seat on the UNSC hampered the request. Europe pays approximately 
40% of the UN budget and Germany is the third biggest contributor behind the United 
States and Japan.151 
C. ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT: LEADERSHIP FROM THE CENTRE 
The policy of leadership from the centre is a change in German foreign policy that 
both assumes a larger international leadership role and represents a challenge for the 
cohesion of both the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
realities of limited domestic support for a larger role on the international stage and the 
lack of support for critical funding to improve the Bundeswehr’s military capabilities 
may check Germany’s international aspirations. The concentration of various crises in 
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and around Europe may overturn some of the core assumptions of civil power as the 
European Union endures its greatest trial in decades.  
Germany’s recent ascent to middle power status has happened very quickly, and 
well ahead of German public opinion which admires more the neutral foreign policies of 
Switzerland and Austria, while failing to recognize that such policy is a dead end.152 
Germany’s is—and has been for quite some time—seeking a permanent seat on the UN 
Security Council, but this effort to gain more power internationally will fall on deaf ears 
unless the German government expresses more willingness to deploy the Bundeswehr in 
a wider range of expeditionary military operations.153 In the wake of recent events, 
including the Ukraine crisis, in the European region have pushed Germany to the 
forefront of European Union foreign relations.154  
There is a claim that Germany cannot promote a successful foreign policy without 
the support of its own effective military capability.155 The German Bundeswehr has 
operated under a mainly support role within the auspices of NATO as a goal of policy to 
avoid too much military power and to assuage public opinion which remains skeptical of 
war, especially in the present. The end of the Cold War, economic constraints, and 
growing security challenges in the Pacific have led to a reduction of US military forces in 
the European theatre—requiring the Europeans to strongly consider providing for more 
of their own security and defense.156 The United States had withdrawn nearly all effective 
military force from Central Europe—that is until the sudden decision to reinforce after 
the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.   
The influence of reconciliation on German foreign and security policy has been 
reduced to almost nothing. Germany still seeks to operate with a multilateral framework, 
but less because of the need to reconcile but more to maximize security on limited 
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budgets. A realistic use of bandwagoning with the current US led world order to get the 
most security for the least cost are behind the German agreements of pooling and sharing 
and the commitment the Atlantic Alliance.157 Germany’s security policy is still driven by 
the same concerns of Bismarck’s time—geopolitics. Germany has safely secured itself in 
the center of the European Union and the center of the NATO Alliance. Germany’s 
security—in geopolitical terms—was greatly enhanced by the EU and NATO periods of 
enlargement that added the nations of Central Europe and the Baltic nations.158 Formal 
agreements with Scandinavian countries whether through the EU, NATO, or both have 
completely encircled Germany by friendly nations. The absence of natural borders has 
been replaced with political borders that have created a virtual buffer zone around the 
German mainland.   
Within this zone of relative security, Germany focused its policy on economic 
growth and further political and economic integration of the European Union within a 
globalized economy. While at the same time, Germany has risen past the traditional 
nuclear powers of France and the United Kingdom to take the de facto leadership role of 
the EU. Germany now finds itself at the center of Europe—geographically and in both 
security and political terms. Since reunification, the German government has also 
separated itself from American policy pressure by demonstrating independence of policy 
decisions in Iraq 2003 joining with France and again in 2011 concerning the Libya UN 
resolution siding with Russia and China against the wishes of its NATO allies.   
The Munich Security Conference is an annual meeting of leaders every February 
in Munich to discuss contemporary security and defense topics affecting the global world 
order. The attendees often include at a minimum the respective Ministers of Defense 
from European nations and the United States and Canada. The conference provides a 
forum for discussion of the most pressing European security topics that are presently 
concerning leaders. The Munich Security Report—first released in 2015—is meant as a 
way to provide topics for discussion and accompanying statistics to support conversations 
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of key issues to be discussed. The 2015 Report highlighted pressure from other powers 
that Germany shoulders its weight in maintaining international security relative with its 
economic influence.159  
Political leaders use the speeches made during the conference as a means for 
nations to declare their own roles in addressing the current security concerns and as a 
way to address any specific concerns of the members of the conference. During the 2015 
Munich Security Conference, German Minister of Defense, Dr. Ursula von der Leyen, 
made a speech titled “Leadership from the Centre.”  The speech’s theme was that 
Germany was ready to lead in Europe, but that it intended to take a new approach to 
leadership in Europe. Dr. Von der Leyen laid out her vision of what leadership from the 
centre means: 
Leading from the centre means to contribute one’s best resources and 
capabilities to alliances and partnerships. Leadership from the centre is as 
we understand it means to enable others with less resources to make their 
vital contributions as equal partners. Leadership from the centre also 
means that two things must come together: The will to act and the 
capability to act.160 
Germany is thus at the centre of transatlantic and European policy. The 2014 Security 
Conference speeches from the German President, Foreign Minister, and Dr. Von der 
Leyen reinforce that the Defense Minister was announcing a conscious shift in German 
strategy concerning foreign and security policy. 
The ambitions of the German government and politicians have constantly moved 
at a pace ahead of the desires of the German populace. This phenomenon was true during 
Adenauer’s Western integration and Brandt’s Ostpolitik, and it remained consistent in the 
post-unification Germany as well. Since unification, the German government 
championed Germany’s drive for further integration. The general public is less 
enthusiastic about the integration and for most people walking the streets of German 
cities and towns, the EU has little effect on their daily lives. Many Germans have mixed 
feelings about such integration. They enjoy travel and lack of border controls, but they 
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are also skeptical of the Euro and nurtures nostalgia for the Deutschmark in what seems 
to many today to have been a simpler world prior to 1989—a wrongheaded nostalgia.161 
Voter turnout for the EU parliamentary elections has been steadily declining across the 
EU, and Germany is part of this trend. Voter turnout numbers in Germany were above 
60% in 1989 and 1994 but it has experienced a steady declining with just over 40% 
reporting to vote in 2009 and 2014 hovering only slightly higher than the EU average.162 
Customarily in Germany, there is highly structured communication between the 
government and the public concerning foreign policy, especially when compared to the 
relationship in the United States or Switzerland.163 The German people have shown a 
lack of commitment to the foreign policy aims of the government, and often a downright 
dissatisfaction, especially when concerning the out-of-area deployment of the 
Bundeswehr.164 In response to this lack of support, the German Foreign Minister, Frank 
Walter Steinmeier, ordered the so-called “Review 2014.” The goal was to create an open 
dialogue between the public and the government about the future and shape of the 
German foreign policy.165 The German Foreign Ministry has released the results of the 
Review 2014 in a document titled “Crisis-Order-Europe.” The review revealed, among 
other topics, that “Germans’ views on foreign policy are anything but static: the younger 
generation has markedly different priorities than the older generations.”166 The open 
dialogue with the Foreign Ministry is a step towards involving more public debate about 
Germany’s role in international affairs, but there is little indication that domestic 
sentiments will hinder the advancement of Berlin’s foreign and security policy goals in 
the future.    
                                               
161 Abenheim, discussion with author, March 3, 2016. 
162 European Parliament 2014 Election Results/Turnout, Accessed on February 5, 2016, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html.  
163 Manfred Mols, ”Policy Advice and Foreign Policy-Making,” from Germany’s New Foreign 
Policy: Decision Making in an Interdependent World, Wolf-Dieter Eberwien & Karl Kaiser, eds., trans. 
Deborah Kaiser & Bryan Ruppert, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 280. 
164 “Germany: Ready To Lead?” 10. 
165 Aussenpolitik-Weiter-Denken, accessed on February 4, 2016, http://www.aussenpolitik-weiter-
denken.de/en/blog/show/article/auftakt-konferenz-im-aa.html  








This thesis cannot proclaim a return of history by suggesting that unstable balance 
of power politics are back in Europe. This thesis recognizes that Germany has undergone 
a significant transformation from the defeated, divided, and occupied nation of 1945. The 
leadership of such visionaries as Adenauer and Brandt that through a policy of 
reconciliation achieved the goals of ensuring the security of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, regaining its sovereignty in return for western integration, and through 
Ostpolitik, laid the foundation for the eventual reunification of Germany in 1990. During 
the Kohl era (1982 – 1998), the dream of a peaceful reunification of Germany became a 
reality, and the path to the EU and the Euro was embarked upon. These men increased 
European integration that would welcome many of the former Central European Soviet 
satellite states that embraced the ideals of liberal democracy. 
This thesis does recognize that Germany has completed a long policy of 
reconciliation, and that reconciliation for Nazi war crimes committed during World War 
II no longer drives the foreign and security policy decisions of the German government. 
The Germany that emerged from defeat bearing the tremendous guilt of the holocaust and 
the Nazis has become the leading nation in Europe through its support for multilateralism 
and increased European integration. This is not to say that Germans have forgotten 
history, but that the reconciliation no longer constitutes the guiding principal of German 
statecraft or the German people in their dealings on the international stage. Egon Bahr, a 
prominent SPD politician and major contributor of Brandt’s Ostpolitik, recently claimed 
that “a Germany in the service of Europe that pursues it interest as a normal state and 
does not let its future be impeded by its past: Europe’s future is more important than 
Germany’s past.”167   
The policy of reconciliation that the Adenauer government adopted drove the 
foreign and security policy of Germany to demonstrate itself as a reliable partner in the 
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security of Western Europe. This policy required the Federal Republic to integrate into 
multilateral economic, security, and political institutions. The need to reconcile with the 
western nations—especially France—guided the West German government first, in order 
to earn acceptance back into the family of nations and second, to gain complete 
sovereignty from the occupying powers. The European Coal and Steel Community 
arrangement with France laid the foundation for the European Union, and the Federal 
Republic was a key supporter in all stages of its development and continues to be a 
leading supporter of further European integration.   
The difference between now and then is that reconciliation no longer solely drives 
Germany’s foreign policy to embrace multilateralism. Instead, Germany’s support of 
multilateralism is driven by national interest amid globalization—specifically the 
economic, political, and security benefits of membership in the European Union. 
Membership in the Eurozone has deflated the value of German goods on the export 
market when compared to the similar costs if Germany still used the Deutschmark. Also, 
by being the leading member of a powerful supranational block of nations with over 500 
million people and trade that accounts for around 20% of global exports and imports, 
Germany exponentially multiplies its diplomatic power when dealing with other nations.   
By integrating into and supporting collective security and defense arrangements 
like the OSCE, CSDP, and most importantly NATO, Germany has achieved a complete 
level of security despite its geographical position in the center of Europe. The fear of 
armies crossing its open borders no longer drives German security policy. Instead, the 
German government elite are focusing security policy on maintaining the Atlantic 
alliance while also building a separate Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union. NATO will continue to provide a level of collective security that the 
EU could not achieve without the powerful military support of the United States and its 
credible nuclear deterrent. 
After unification, and more recently, with the odd retreat of France and the United 
Kingdom, Germany has become the leading nation in the European Union. Some 
observers consider Germany to be the great power in Europe surpassing the nuclear 
armed and permanent UN Security Council members of France and the United Kingdom. 
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This policy should not be a cause, as realists like Mearsheimer wrote, to believe that a 
Germany would be a destabilizing force in Europe and would seek to arm itself with 
nuclear weapons.168 Germany’s growing power has come without the added and utterly 
unwanted burden of financing a costly nuclear program through its continued credibility 
as a NATO member. Instead, Germany has used its powerful position to steer EU policy, 
and to further advance the European Union’s foreign and security policy both politically 
and economically. This power has allowed Germany the freedom of policy to stand on its 
own—like with Iraq (2003) and Libya (2011)—in pursuit of its own interest—to act or 
not to act and to act in regions more aligned with EU and by default, Germany’s own 
national interest. Kundnani asserts that in some ways, Germany’s status as a potential 
hegemon has created instability in Europe by forcefully exporting its “stability culture”—
particularly in economic terms.169 
Germany’s leadership has emerged because of its ability to lead from the center. 
Its geographic position in the center of Europe and its unique understanding of the Cold 
War from both the western and the central European views allows Germany to be a 
uniting force in the EU. Germany was a supporter of both EU and NATO expansion to 
include the new burgeoning democracies of Central Europe in an effort to ensure their 
success, and for them to gain the acceptance into the family of nation not as soviet 
satellites but as full members of the international community. These shared collective 
memories of life on both sides of the Iron Curtain will continue to provide Germany a 
special relationship between Eastern and Western Europe. 
German politicians have sought to further integrate the EU by expanding the 
capabilities of the Common Security and Defense Policy. Diplomatically, the CFSP and 
German security policy may frustrate United States leadership with its Eurocentric focus. 
By understanding the geopolitical history of the Bismarck era, Americans can better 
understand why Germany—and by association the EU—will focus on protecting Europe, 
and it will not see the inherent benefit in international engagements outside of the 
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European area. A reflection of Bismarck’s Africa comments can shed light on the 
foundations of Germany’s current security policy focus. 
The first article of the 2015 Munich Security Report calls on Germany to assume 
responsibilities respective to its great power status.170 Abenheim and Halladay believe 
that this prototypical Western viewpoint lacks a developed understanding of the effect of 
the nation’s lesson learned from its history.171 As noted above, the constraints of the 
defeat from World War II and the holocaust have lessened in the decade since 2003. 
Germany has established itself as a normal power, but collective memories remain a 
powerful force among the public. The guilt of the previous generation has been replace 
with a feeling of victimhood by some in the current generation, and Kundnani asserts that 
“debates about German national identity were expressed through a competition between 
two specific collective memories: Auschwitz and Dresden.”172 Germany’s successful 
policy of reconciliation has subsided, and Berlin now totes its approach to foreign and 
security policy as a normal nation allowed to pursue its national interest, often ahead of 
public opinion.173 
German leadership has emerged to pursue its diplomacy not through the threat of 
military force, but with the weight of the financial and economic power of the European 
Union. Maintaining open lines of communication and reinforcing the integrity of the 
European Union will remain central to the security and defense policy of Germany, 
similar to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe that shaped the foreign 
policy of the Bismarck era. The German government’s desire to retain its newly earned 
primacy in Europe will also oblige Germany to increase the capabilities and modernize 
the Bundeswehr into a credible expeditionary force. Increasing globalization and 
economic integration will compel Germany to place more focus on the ability to operate 
in areas outside of its typical range of military operations to protect the economic sources 
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of Germany’s power base. This policy, of course, requires an investment of large sums of 
money redirected to the modernization of the Bundeswehr.   
Offensive realism fails to fully explain Germany’s position on foreign policy. 
Germany’s pursuit for national interest cannot be divorced from its geopolitical position 
in Europe. Unlike the United States or the United Kingdom, historical adversaries 
geographically surround Germany on all sides without the benefit of Mearsheimer’s 
concept of “the stopping power of water.”174 Hard lessons from the past have taught the 
Germans to respect their geopolitical realities and to seek security not through military 
action but instead through collective security arrangements like NATO and the EU.   
Germany lacks a cohesive national security strategy, and the culture has left a 
debate concerning security policy small and quiet.175 The current vulnerabilities exposed 
by the migrant crisis have pushed EU border protection to the forefront of security policy. 
The porous borders combined with the real threats of terrorism brought to light with the 
attacks in France in 2015, have touched on many of the key themes of the European 
security Strategy like terrorism and controlling large-scale migration flow to the EU.176 
Germany may have to move beyond its post-heroic quasi-pacifistic nature in order to 
save the European Union from a period of resurgent nationalism that threatens the hard 
won integration showcased in the Schengen Zone.177 
Miskimmon’s comments of nations propensity to upload and download policies 
from the super international institution sheds light on how Germany uses the European 
Union to advance its foreign and security policy goals. In recent years Germany has been 
uploading many of its policies to the European Union, and then downloading may these 
policies on other European Union nations.178  An example of this has been prevalent in 
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the news, is the economic austerity policy that has been forced on Portugal, Spain, Italy, 
and Greece. As long as the European Union survives, Germany plays the lead role in the 
direction of policy, but if the Union begins crumble Germany will seek to consolidate its 
regional hegemony.  
During the 2015 Munich Security Conference, the German Minister of Defense 
claimed that Germany was ready to “lead from the centre.”179 This thesis has determined 
that this represents a change in the direction of German foreign policy, but that this 
change has been part of an evolution of Germany from a defeated, occupied, and divided 
nation to the great power in the European Union. The years when Germany’s foreign 
policies were driven by influential leadership striving to reconcile the nation’s violent 
history have been replace by the drive to pursue national interests as a normal nation. The 
realities of external security threats to the European Union and the internal economic 
crises since the global financial collapse of 2008 have forced Germany to act more like 
the international relations theory of realism predicts. This shift has widened the gap 
between the German government’s ambitions to play a stronger role in global security 
and the continued domestic support for more civilian power. Helga Welsh, Professor of 
Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University, comments that a “culture of 
restraint in military matters has infiltrated the attitudes and values of German elites and 
citizens, and life on the front line of the Cold War left its imprint.”180 Kundnani further 
asserts that twenty years after reunification, “Never again War” has seemed to replace 
“Never again Auschwitz” as Germany’s guiding principle on the use of military force.181 
As Germany faces a new set of leadership challenges, have the security policy decisions 
and goals from the past set Germany up to succeed? 
Of course, some aspects of the past will be brought to bear against the current 
aspiration of German policy—like the Der Spiegel cover declaring “The German 
Übermacht” while displaying Chancellor Angela Merkel superimposed alongside Nazis 
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on top of the Acropolis in Athens in 1941.182 The magazine went to print amid the 
bilateral disaster of the Euro crisis and the austerity regime as Greece was claiming a 
right to war reparations from Nazi hostilities during the war. The difference was that 
these statements and attempts to link the past with present failed to garner the response 
that it may have received a decade earlier. The Germans maintained their position on 
austerity measures undeterred by attempts to way public opinions with historical 
references to Nazi propaganda. Barbara Kunz of the French Institute of International 
Relations (IFRI) admits, “the political price tag of deploying the Bundeswehr is high, and 
ethical considerations dominate the public debate surrounding them. In this context, and 
absent clearly defined German strategic interests, conflicts with allies, including France, 
often seem like the lesser evil.”183 
It is interesting to compare the differing geographies of the seven great powers: 
the Unites States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Germany.184  
Immediately one notices the limited access to the oceans that may limit a great power’s 
ability to utilize a large navy, such is the case for Germany. Germany has no history of 
the age of exploration, having not been unified until the mid-19th century. Furthermore, 
Germany is destined by geography to be a great land power. Once consolidated as one 
unified Germany, if forever changed the balance of power in Europe. Despite a 
devastating defeat in the first world war and a total defeat of the second world war, 
resulting occupation, accountability for a devastating genocide, and the division of the 
nation on two different sides of an idealistic Cold War Germany is once again united and 
once again considered the great power in Europe. History recounts that a nation cannot 
escape its geography, and Germany’s geographic position with no natural defensive 
borders in the center of Europe guides the nation’s view to both East and West. Germany 
has once again risen from the ashes like the mythical phoenix; hopefully this time, the 
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Germans returned to power will manifest itself benevolently instead of with instability 
and violence. 
The fact that the list of the seven contemporary great power includes Germany 
explains a great deal why there is a request for Germany to take on a larger share of the 
global security role. Germany seems to recoil from out of area operations, and even when 
it does participate within a coalition framework—often the national caveats severely limit 
the potential effectiveness of the German forces.185 Germany’s emerging status as a 
reluctant hegemon in Europe—amid the waning power of the United Kingdom and 
France—places a responsibility to provide more for international security.186 
Nevertheless, the real danger for Germany is to let history constrain its emerging 
international power solely in the European region or without the benefit of a capable 
military force. The world order is changing, and Western power in the world may be in 
decline. At the very least, the United States will be heavily employed in the Middle East 
and the Far East to maintain its grip on vital sea lines of communication that account for 
a large percentage of its economy. The German’s should heed the calls of the Western 
nations for it to take on more global responsibility by stepping out to lead from the front. 
                                               
185 Belkin, “Trends and Transatlantic Implications,” 22. 
186 Kundnani, Paradox, 108.  
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